An unpublished algorithm of Haldar and Vidyasankar implements an atomic variable of an arbitrary type T for one writer and one reader by means of 4 unsafe variables of type T , three two-valued safe variables, and one three-valued regular variable. We present this algorithm, and prove its correctness by means of a refinement towards a known specification of an atomic variable. The refinement is a composition of refinement functions and a forward simulation. The correctness proof requires many nontrivial invariants. In its construction, we relied on the proof assistant PVS for the administration of invariants and proofs and the preservation of consistency.
Introduction
The design of an algorithm ideally starts with the specification and proceeds via a number of motivated refinement steps to conclude with an implementation. In the field of concurrency, however, this ideal is more often proclaimed than executed. In our practice, more often, the designer has an idea for a concurrent algorithm, and while trying to develop and prove the algorithm, he changes the algorithm until it is concrete enough and has an associated proof. Just as often, at the other side of the spectrum, there may be an algorithm with or without any proof, and we may want to decide its correctness (and the reliability of the proof).
In any case, we want our methods for the analysis of algorithms to be strong enough to ascertain or refute their correctness. Naturally, most publications with a methodological aim present idealized design scenarios and algorithms that fit such an idealized design, but most algorithms are not designed for methodological purposes, and can yet be presented with a more or less fitting proof.
In the present case, we want to present an algorithm, not because it has important applications, but mainly because it offers a challenge to the research community and a little bit because it has an instructive proof. We present it with a refinement proof that has been constructed and verified with the proof assistant PVS of [10] . The challenge is to present the algorithm with a more natural design and a more intuitive verification. For now, however, we have no alternative to offer.
In the nineties, Haldar, Subramanian, and Vidyasankar set themselves the task to construct an atomic variable of some arbitrary type Item for one writer and one reader by means of unsafe variables of type Item together with some nonatomic control variables, preferably boolean. The paper of [3] presents a construction C1 that uses four unsafe variables of type Item together with three safe boolean variables, in which the writer may have to do two Item assignments. We gave an assertional proof of algorithm C1 in [5] .
The algorithm we treat here is construction C2 of Haldar and Vidyasankar (private communication, 2006) of an atomic variable of type Item for one reader and one writer in which the writer does only one Item assignment. It again uses four unsafe variables of type Item, but now three safe boolean variables and one regular three-valued variable (the latter can be replaced by two safe boolean variables). Algorithm C2 is more difficult than C1 because the writer only writes once and subtle communication with the reader is needed to ensure that it writes under mutual exclusion and is yet at a place where the reader can read next time.
Haldar and Vidyasankar have conjectured (unpublished) that the algorithms C1 and C2 are optimal in the sense of using minimal sets of nonatomic variables and assignments to them. So, if it can be argued that algorithm C2 is ugly, it is not just a random algorithm.
The correctness issue of an algorithm that implements atomic variables by means of nonatomic ones always leads to two questions. How to model the actions on the nonatomic variables? And how to decide that the algorithm indeed implements an atomic variable?
With respect to the first point, we present a novel treatment of unsafe, safe, and regular variables. We model them by extending the assignments to them with alternative temporary assignments. We then use a refinement function to eliminate the extra variables introduced, at the cost of making inspection of the nonatomic variables more nondeterministic.
As for the second point, in [4] , we determined a criterion for atomicity that was based on the definition of atomicity in [9] , and we used this to prove atomicity for the algorithms of [2, 11] . Afterwards, we felt that the definition of atomicity in [9] was too complicated and verbose for such an elementary property as atomicity. We therefore developed and proved a related refinement criterion for atomicity in [6] . This criterion is simplified here to a specification HqRW of an atomic read-write variable to which it is suitable to make refinement functions.
The criterion is applied as follows. After the elimination of the extra variables mentioned above, we use a forward simulation to introduce ghost variables to construct a refinement function towards HqRW . This gives us six proof obligations for atomicity. These proof obligations are just safety conditions, i.e., invariants. Four of them are easily resolved. The two remaining proof obligations turn out to be challenging. They require more than twenty auxiliary invariants. It is here that, in an earlier effort, we needed a model checker to support our failing intuition for reliable invariants. In this earlier effort, we remained in a single state space and did not use refinement functions and forward simulations.
The present treatment with refinement functions and forward simulations gives a cleaner separation between modelling, proof obligations, and auxiliary constructions. Yet in the end, the number of invariants required to fulfill the proof obligations is roughly the same. The new approach has the additional advantage that it can easily include a minor variation of algorithm C2 in which the regular three-valued variable is replaced by two safe boolean variables.
Overview. In Section 2, we discuss and formalize the various forms of nonatomic shared variables that occur in the algorithm. Algorithm C2 itself is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the specifications ARW and HqRW of atomic read-write variables and describe the concepts of implementation and simulation used to relate different specifications, following [1, 6] .
In Section 5, algorithm C2 is transformed into a specification HVc2 in the same format as HqRW . Subsequently, we eliminate the nonatomic variables via a refinement function towards a specification HVc2a, and we then prove that the unsafe variables are treated under mutual exclusion as required.
In Section 6, we construct a forward simulation towards a specification HVc2b with "ghost variables" that are needed for a refinement function towards HqRW . The requirements for refinement functions then induce six proof obligations. These proof obligations are resolved by introducing and proving a host of invariants. Section 7 contains the variation (HVac2 ) of the algorithm in which the three-valued regular variable is replaced by two safe bit variables. In Section 8 we draw the conclusions.
The PVS proof of algorithm C2 consists of the construction and verification of a simulation relation from specification HVc2 , via HVc2a and HVc2b , towards HqRW . It also contains a refinement function from the alternative specification HVac2 towards HVc2a. This proof is available at www.cs.rug.nl/ ∼ wim/mechver/atomicity/index.html.
Nonatomic shared variables
We first have to recall or introduce the concepts of safeness, regularity, and atomicity of shared variables. In this section, we allow arbitrary many processes, but for simplicity we only consider shared variables that are written by a single process. Since the processes themselves are sequential, it follows that different write operations to the same variable never overlap.
The minimal correctness assumption for a shared variable is therefore that every read operation that does not overlap with any write operation returns the most recently written value. Following [7] , a shared variable is called safe iff every read operation that overlaps with a write operation returns some legitimate value of the domain of the variable. A variable is called unsafe iff it is not safe. For an unsafe variable, a read operation is not allowed to overlap with write operations since otherwise chaos may result.
A shared variable x is called regular iff a read operation on x concurrent with some write operations may return either the old value of x, or any of the values that are being written concurrently. Clearly, every regular variable is safe, but if the type of x has three or more values, a safe variable x need not be regular. Since we can ensure that a writer only writes x := E under the precondition x = E, an algorithm with regular boolean variables can be easily transformed into one with safe boolean variables.
Finally, a shared variable is atomic iff read and write operations behave as if they never overlap but always occur in some total order that refines the precedence order (an operation precedes another iff it terminates before the other starts).
We introduced a formal model for safe variables in [5] . We now extend this model with regular and unsafe variables. Indeed, since assertional reasoning depends on the states between the atomic steps, we need to model the actions as atomic steps of some kind. By convention, shared variables are written in typewriter font and private variables are written slanted.
A read action of a shared variable x into a private variable v is written v := x. It can be regarded as atomic, since it does not influence the shared state. We only need to reckon with the possibility that it overlaps with one or more write actions to x.
For a safe shared variable, we need to indicate that reading during a write action can return any value. We therefore denote a write action of a private expression E into a safe shared variable x by (flickering) x := E.
(1)
In relational semantics like TLA of [8] , we model this by a predicate like
The primes are used for the values of the variables after the step, pc stands for the location pointer, and by convention all variables apart from pc and x are unchanged. In other words, command (1) is modelled in (1a) as a repetition of arbitrary assignments to x that ends with the actual assignment of E to x. The value of x during the repetition is indeterminate. We assume the liveness condition that the repetition terminates. For a regular variable, reading during concurrent write actions can return either the old value or any of the new values. So, there is the same kind of flickering, but only between the old and the new values. We denote a write action of a private expression E into a regular shared variable x by (regular) x := E.
(
In order to model this, we introduce a second variable xS (to be called the shadow of x) of the same type as x to hold the latest correct value of x. The step then gets the relational meaning given by
Indeed, during a write action, any reading process can read the old or the new value. When a read action overlaps with several write actions, the result can be the old value or any of the new values, since conceptually the read action is shrunk to an atomic one that coincides with the write action of the value that turns out to have been read. A write action of a private expression E into an unsafe shared variable x is written
Inspired by a suggestion of Lamport, this is formalized as a two-step write operation. If x is of type T , we allow x temporarily to hold values of type T ∪ {⊥}, and we assume that reading ⊥ into a private variable leads to chaotic behaviour. The step gets the relational meaning of first repeatedly writing ⊥, concluded by the actual assignment:
This leads to the proof obligation v = ⊥ for all private variables v used for storing the result of reading x. Of course, we have the additional complications that x = ⊥ holds initially, and that expression E is of type T , i.e. = ⊥.
Since there is only one process writing x, we do allow expression E in (1), (2), or (3) to contain x. Then E is not private and, in order to transform (1) into (1a), etc., we use the shadow xS as a private variable of the writer to hold the old value of x, so that expression E is truly private and the transformation is allowed. For this purpose, we extend (1a) and (3a) with conjuncts expressing that xS is modified only in the concluding assignment, just as in (2a). In all three cases, we have the obvious invariant that xS = x unless the unique process that can assign x is indeed assigning x.
The above assertional characterizations of safe, regular, and unsafe variables are nontrivial consequences of the behavioural definitions, also valid when there is more than one reading process. The translation from the behavioural to the assertional setting requires rather delicate behavioural arguments. Since such a translation would distract us from our central aims, we just postulate the above characterizations.
Algorithm C2
Algorithm C2 of Haldar and Vidyasankar implements an atomic variable of type Item written by one writer process and read by one reader process by means of four unsafe variables of type Item, three safe variables of a two-valued domain for the writer, and one regular three-valued variable for the reader. The algorithm uses the following shared variables:
type Bit = {0, 1} , Tri = {0, 1, 2} ; var buf : array Bit, Bit of unsafe Item ; ww, cc : safe Bit ; fw : safe Bool ; rr : regular Tri .
The basic idea is that, roughly speaking, buf[ww, cc] holds the latest item written. If the reader does not read, the writer toggles cc at every write action. When the reader reads a new item, it sets rr := ww. When the writer notices this after writing, it sets fw to true to notify the reader that it will toggle ww at its next write action.
The reader only reads buf[rr, lc], where rr and lc are intended as copies of ww and cc, respectively. To remember the latest item in cases where actual reading is not necessary, the reader has a persistent private variable result:
The initial state is required to satisfy
Writing an argument arg is implemented by The reader's assignment (*) rr := 2 is not superfluous. If we would omit it, the value of rr would flicker between 0 and 1 during the next assignment. Therefore, the writer could infer almost nothing from reading rr and, hence, could not avoid writing an element of buf while the reader would be reading there. The following scenario for the case that (*) is omitted shows what can go wrong. Let the reader start reading in a state with ¬fw and rr = cc = 0 and ww = 1. The reader sees ¬fw, sets lw := 1, and starts toggling rr between 0 and 1. During this toggling, the writer writes four times: firstly, it writes buf[1, 1], sets cc := 1, reads rr = 1 = ww and sets fw := true; secondly it writes buf[0, 1] and sets ww := 0, fw := false; thirdly it writes buf[0, 0], sets cc := 0, reads rr = 0 = ww and sets fw := true; fourthly it writes buf [1, 0] . During the fourth writing, the reader terminates its toggling, sets rr := 1 and lc := 0, and reads buf [1, 0] . This leads to chaotic results because the writer is writing there. Assignment (*) in algorithm C2 precludes this scenario because rr can now toggle only between 0 and 2, or 2 and 1.
Unfortunately, we cannot explain why the algorithm with (*) included should be correct. Indeed, we started the verification with an open mind to prove or to refute the correctness, and we now only accept the correctness because of our mechanically verified proof.
Notice that procedure read does not actually read in a situation where it finds fw false and ww = rr. In that case, the reader just returns the old value of result. This may hold, e.g., in the initial state when the writer has not yet written.
Specifications of atomicity
We use the modelling of atomic variables of [6] , but we specialize to the case of a single reader and a single writer. The procedure calls are modelled with potentially infinite loops. For both reader and writer we reserve location 0 for the environment that may call them and that will provide the writer with its arguments. The environment is not subject to liveness conditions. The writer and reader use locations from 20 and 50 onward, and are subject to the fairness condition that they always eventually reestablish pc = 0.
The environment only acts when pc = 0. We write pw and pr for pc of writer and reader, respectively. We give the environment a variable out to observe the result of reading, because the moment this result becomes available must not be observable.
Environment:
[] pw = 0 → arg := arbitrary ; pw := 20 .
[] pr = 0 → pr := 50 .
[] pr = 0 → out := result .
The abstract specification ARW of a read-write system with two processes just uses a single shared variable, say var reg : Item ; and the processes are modelled by:
Writer: 20: reg := arg ; goto 0 . Reader: 50:
result := reg ; goto 0 .
Implementation as observable trace inclusion
What does it mean that algorithm C2 implements specification ARW ? For this, we use the theory of [1] in the version of [6] . According to this theory, an algorithm implements a specification if every behaviour of the algorithm is observably equivalent to a behaviour of the specification. Here, a behaviour is an infinite sequence of subsequent states that starts in an initial state, does steps of the algorithm or specification, and satisfies the liveness conditions imposed. Two infinite sequences of states are observably equivalent if both sequences can be extended with stuttering steps to sequences such that, for every index, the pair of states at that index is observably equivalent. Two states are observably equivalent if their observable variables are equal.
The standard methods to prove implementation relations are by means of refinement functions and forward simulations. For simplicity of presentation, we here ignore the liveness conditions for all algorithms and specifications. We refer to [1, 6] for details.
If K and L are specifications, a function f : states(K ) → states(L) is a refinement function from K to L if, for every initial state x of K , the state f (x) is initial for L, and there is an invariant J of specification K such that for
A binary relation R between states(K ) and states(L) is a forward simulation from K to L if, for every initial state x of K , there is an initial state y of L with (x, y) ∈ R, and there is an invariant J of K such that, for every step (x, x ) of K and every state y of L with (x, y) ∈ R and x ∈ J , there is a step (y, y ) of L with (x , y ) ∈ R.
The specification HqRW
We apply the theory of [6] to prove that the algorithm C2 implements specification ARW . For this purpose, we developed a more liberal abstract specification HqRW of an atomic variable. It uses the declarations:
The writer and reader have private variables firstW , sqnW and firstR , sqnR , respectively. Function hist stands for the history of written values, sqnW and sqnR stand for sequence numbers, masq stands for the maximum sequence number, and firstW and firstR stand for the value of masq when the process starts its current operation.
The writer and reader are specified by Writer: 20: firstW := masq ; goto 21 . 21:
choose sqnW with firstW < sqnW ∧ hist(sqnW ) = ⊥ ; hist(sqnW ) := arg ; goto 22 . 22:
masq := max(masq, sqnW ) ; goto 0 .
So the writer puts its argument somewhere in the sequence hist.
Reader: 50: firstR := masq ; goto 51 . 51:
choose sqnR with firstR ≤ sqnR ∧ hist(sqnR ) = ⊥ . result := hist(sqnR ) ; goto 52 ; 52:
masq := max(masq, sqnR ) ; goto 0 .
The reader obtains its result from the sequence hist. The numbers masq, sqnW , and sqnR serve to ensure linearizable behaviour.
In [6] , it is proved that a minor variation of this specification called HRW implements the abstract specification ARW . Actually, in HRW the commands 22 and 52 are split over two locations, but since the values of pc are private and not observable, the quicker version HqRW implements the slightly slower version HRW . This is proved in the new PVS proof of [6] , by means of a so-called gliding simulation. We thus have that HqRW implements ARW .
Specification HVc2
The question is now whether algorithm C2 implements specification HqRW . We therefore reformulate algorithm C2 as a specification HVc2 in the format of specifications ARW and HqRW . In accordance with Section 2, we introduce shadow variables wwS, ccS, and rrS with the same types and initializations as ww, cc, and rr, respectively. The shadow of fw is unnecessary because fw is safe and is not read by the writer. So, the state space of HVc2 is spanned by the variables mentioned in Section 3 together with the shadow variables wwS, ccS, rrS, and the program counters pw and pr.
The writer is transformed into: In 54 and 55, the reader may repeatedly perform incomplete assignments to the regular variable rr.
In this way, the algorithm is turned into a specification HVc2 . Its state consists of the values of all variables, including the location counters pw of the writer and pr of the reader. In every state, either process is able to do one or more steps. For example, in a state with pw = 23 and pr = 52 and fw = false, the writer can make fw := true or pw := 28, or the reader can make pr := 53.
Specification HVc2 gives the proof obligation that rr = 2 at 57. This proof obligation will be resolved by invariant Iq5 below. The proof obligation for the unsafe variables buf will be resolved in Section 5.3.
We then proceed to prove that specification HVc2 implements HqRW . This is done by means of three implementation relations, viz. a refinement function from HVc2 to HVc2a, a forward simulation from HVc2a to HVc2b , and a refinement function from HVc2b to HqRW .
Invariants for HVc2
In order to eliminate the shadow variables, we develop some easy invariants. During the design, the list of invariants continuously changes: new ones are proposed, some invariants turn out to be invalid, some invariants are abolished as superfluous since they are implied by other ones. Also, the order of presentation changes. The list lives in two different documents: the document of the conceptual proof and the PVS proof script. For the ease of finding and replacing the invariants consistently, without replacing other identifiers by mishap, we give them systematic names of the form Xqd where X gives an indication of the kind of invariant, the q is to preclude mishap, and the d is a sequence number < 10.
It is clear that ww and cc are equal to their shadows at all locations without assignments to them:
The test of fw in 20 entails the obvious invariants:
For the reader, we observe that the regular variable rr always equals its shadow or, at an assignment location, possibly, the new value:
Iq4 : rr = rrS ∨ (pr = 54 ∧ rr = 2) ∨ (pr = 55 ∧ rr = lw) .
The variables rr and rrS get their values from lw. We therefore have:
In the proof of Iq6 , we use that Iq4 and Iq5 imply that rr = rrS ∈ {0, 1} at 53, and that the test in 53 gives rr = lw.
A more abstract algorithm
We now simplify specification HVc2 to HVc2a, where the variables wwS, ccS, lw, and rrS are eliminated. The state space of HVc2a is spanned by the variables buf : array Bit, Bit of Item ; ww, cc, rr, lc : Bit ; fw : Bool ; pw, pr : N .
We move the assignments in 22, 25, 27 one location upward, and make them atomic. The nondeterminacy entailed by the nonatomic assignments is made explicit at the locations where these variables are being read. The nondeterministic choices at 50, 51, 52, 53, 56 reflect the flickering of fw, cc, and ww. We thus eliminate the nonatomicity and the flickering and replace it by nondeterminacy at the point where the variables are inspected. Note that the two processes now inspect each other's program counters. It follows that the skip statements in 22, 25, 27, 54, and 55 cannot be eliminated directly. We claim specification HVc2 implements HVc2a. This is proved by means of the refinement function fca given by Here x is a state of HVc2 and the resulting state fca(x) is described as a record in the PVS notation. The correctness proof of this refinement function is based on the invariants Iq0 up to Iq7 mentioned above. The disjunct x.rr = 2 is needed to define fca everywhere on the state space. It is superfluous on the reachable states because of Iq5 .
Writer of
We postpone the question whether this specification implements specification ARW to Section 6 and first resolve the proof obligations for the unsafe variables buf.
Unsafeness
The only unsafe shared variables are the elements of array buf. Since they are only read into the private variable result, the corresponding proof obligation is that always:
To prove this, we need to know when buf[i, j] = ⊥ holds. Since it is false initially, and since ⊥ is only written at 21 and 24 when the writer stays in that location, we have the easy invariant
Actually, in order to prove that this predicate is preserved by the assignments to buf in 21 and 24, we need the invariant
which is obvious since it holds initially and ⊥ is never chosen in line 20.
Since the reader only reads buf[rr, lc], and that only at 57, the invariance of US would follow from the following two derived proof obligations:
These invariants express mutual exclusion: when the writer is writing into a buffer, the reader should not be reading the same buffer.
Recall that an invariant is a predicate that holds in all reachable states. A predicate is called inductive if it holds initially and is preserved in every step. It is well known that every inductive predicate is an invariant. Below we shall make lists of invariants, and only the conjunctions of these lists will turn out to be inductive, but that is sufficient to prove that all members of the lists are invariants.
One may try and visualize the state space as a high-dimensional grid and the reachable states as forming a rather intractable subset of it. The proof obligations and the invariants are then boxes (hopefully) around the reachable states. Because they are expressed in one or two lines, these boxes consist of a few straight (linear) walls. The proof is the construction of boxes to fend off the forbidden areas. This image is technically useless, but may help the intuition.
There are two approaches to find invariants. The top-down approach starts with the specification, tries to find invariants to prove the specification, and then invariants to support the preservation of the first list of invariants. The bottom-up approach starts with the algorithm, tries to identify potentially useful invariants, and to build upon these, towards the specification. In the top-down approach the invariants tend to be well-motivated but unconvincing. In the bottom-up approach, they tend to be likely, but less to the purpose. The approaches need to complement each other. In the top-down approach, one needs to look at the algorithm to see what is likely to be valid. With the bottom-up approach, one needs to investigate what is needed to imply the specification.
In general, we prefer to follow the top-down approach, both in the design of the proof and in the presentation, because it gives more insight into the logical structure. In the design phase, it is also a way to avoid proving useless invariants, but it entails the risk of introducing invalid invariants.
In the next paragraphs we strongly rely on the proof assistant PVS. We first note that the invariants Iq2 and Iq3 of algorithm C2 are equally valid in our abstract algorithm, although as predicates on a different state space. We actually need the following slightly stronger versions:
Iq2a:
pw ∈ {21, 22, 23, 27} ⇒ fw , Iq3a:
pw ∈ {24, 25, 26} ⇒ ¬fw .
In order to prove US0 , it suffices to show that pw = 21 implies rr = ww. This follows from Iq2a together with the predicate:
The validity of Jq2 is nontrivial. Since ww, fw, and rr are only modified in 21, 23, 26, and 53, and command 23 falsifies fw, predicate Jq2 is threatened only at 26. It is preserved at 26 because of the new invariant:
Jq3 : pr = 54 ⇒ rr = ww .
Predicate Jq3 is threatened only at 21 and 53. It is preserved at 21 because of Iq2a and Jq4 , and at 53 because of Jq5 :
Predicate Jq4 is threatened only at 26 and 53. It is preserved at 53 because of Jq2 , and at 26 because of Jq3 . Predicate Jq5 is preserved at 21, 50, and 52 because of Iq2a and Jq2 . All these predicates also hold initially. This concludes the proof of invariance of Jq0 .
Predicate US1 is implied by Iq3a together with the new invariant:
Predicate Kq0 is threatened only in 21 and 23. It is preserved at 21 because of Iq2 and at 23 because of the new invariant:
Predicate Kq1 is threatened only in 21. It is preserved because of Iq2a and Jq2 . Again the initializations are trivial. This concludes the proof of the invariant Kq0 , and therefore of US0 and US1 , and hence of US .
Atomicity
We now turn to the proof that the algorithm implements an atomic read-write system, in the sense that it implements specification HqRW of Section 4.2.
Extending HVc2a towards HVc2b
For this purpose, we extend HVc2a with the variables declared for HqRW , as ghost variables or history variables. We extend the first and last command of reader and writer with the assignments first := masq and masq := max(masq, sqn), respectively. Because there is only one writer, the writer can choose sqnW := sqnW + 1 at the commands where it writes into the buffer, i.e., at 21 and 24.
The reader needs to choose sqnR equal to the number sqnW that the writer has chosen when writing to the buffer. To make this possible, we introduce a ghost variable:
var tag : array Bit, Bit of Nat , and decide that the writer stores sqnW in the field of tag corresponding to the buffer where it is writing. In view of the result of Section 5.3, we can delete the flickering assignments of ⊥ to buf in 21 and 24. The commands 20, 21, 24, and 28 are therefore replaced as follows. masq := max(masq, sqnW ) ; goto 0 .
Writer of HVc2b
The reader reads its result at 57 and therefore chooses sqnR also at that location. The reader commands 50, 57, and 58 are therefore replaced as follows.
Reader of HVc2b: 50: firstR := masq ; goto (fw ? 51 : 53) ; 57:
result := buf[rr, lc] ; sqnR := tag[rr, lc] ; goto 58 ; 58:
The other commands of the abstract specification of Section 5.2 are retained, but are now interpreted on the state space of HVc2b . The initial state is characterized by
It is straightforward though cumbersome to verify that we have a forward simulation Rab from HVc2a to HVc2b given by
This forward simulation is a little bit more than an extension with history variables [1] , because we also removed the ⊥ assignments to fields of buf in 21 and 24.
From HVc2b towards HqRW
In order to show that specification HVc2b implements specification HqRW of Section 4.2, we need to show that the choices of sqnW and sqnR in 21, 24, and 57 satisfy the conditions expressed for HqRW , and that the result delivered at 58 equals hist(sqnR ).
The steps 21 and 24 of HVc2b satisfy the conditions at 21 in HqRW because of the following assertions:
Atm0 :
Step 57 of HVc2b satisfies the conditions at 51 of HqRW because of Atm2 :
Specification HVc2b also allows a jump from 53 to 58 in which the reader uses its previous result of reading. This jump must also simulate reading as in 51 of HqRW . In order to prove this, we postulate the invariants:
Atm4 : hist(sqnR ) = result = ⊥ , Atm5 : pr = 53 ∧ (ww = rr ∨ pw = 22) ⇒ firstR ≤ sqnR .
It remains to prove Atm0 up to Atm5 . We first deal with the easy proof obligations Atm0 , Atm1 , Atm2 , and Atm4 . It turns out that Atm0 itself is inductive because hist is only modified at sqnW , and sqnW only increases.
In order to prove Atm1 , we observe the easy inequalities:
Indeed, because masq only increases and firstW gets its values from masq, Lq0 is invariant. The argument for Lq1 is similar. The invariance of Lq2 follows from Lq1 and the invariance of Lq3 follows from Lq2 . Finally, Atm1 is implied by Lq0 and Lq3 . The invariance of Atm2 follows from Lq1 at the locations 21 and 24, elsewhere it is obvious. The invariance of Atm4 follows from Lq2 at 21 and 24, and from Atm2 at 57. This leaves Atm3 and Atm 5 as proof obligations, but these ones are difficult.
Upper bounds for firstR
Predicate Atm3 expresses that the item read by the reader is not too old. As a first approximation we note the easy invariants
We also note that the invariants Iq2a, Iq3a, Jq1 , . . . , Jq5 , Kq0 , Kq1 of HVc2a are easily extended literally to specification HVc2b . Because they are defined on a different state space, we give these extended invariants the names Iq2b , Iq3b , Jq1b , . . . , Kq1b .
The proof of invariance of Atm3 is so delicate that one may prefer to skip it. It was designed in the top-down fashion. For each invariant, we proceed as follows. We ask PVS to prove its invariance, we note the locations where it cannot prove this, as well as the failing conditions. The failing conditions are then used to postulate new invariants. Creativity is needed to generalize and unify the invariants. The litany that follows is a careful report of the result of theorem proving, but the reader should not try to reproduce all these verifications manually. This part of the proof feels to us like climbing a winding staircase described by the four fields of tag.
Predicate Atm3 is threatened only at the locations 21, 24, 52, and 56. It is preserved at 21 and 24 because of Lq3 and Lq4 . It is preserved at 52 and 56 because of Iq2b and the new invariants: 
The remainder of the proof of Atm3
It remains to prove the two invariants Nq0 , Pq0 about masq. These give rise to upper bounds for sqnR and tag. As before, we frequently apply the invariants Iq2b , Iq3b , Jq2b , and the invariants of the family Lq* . Let us call them the basic invariants. We henceforth focus on the more uncommon invariants, and only mention application of the basic invariants when there are no other invariants involved.
Predicate Nq0 is threatened at 21, 53, and 58. It is preserved because of Jq5b and the new predicate Predicate Qq4 is threatened at 24, 50, and 53. It is preserved because of Pq1 . This concludes the proof of Atm5 .
Refinement towards HqRW
We prove that specification HVc2b implements HqRW by means of a refinement function fbh from the state space XB of HVc2b to the state space XH of HqRW . Function fbh preserves the variables that occur in both spaces: arg, result, hist, masq, firstW , sqnW , firstR , sqnR . It removes the other implementation variables, and it compresses the locations. Therefore, for x ∈ XB , the program counters of fbh (x) satisfy:
fbh (x).pw = (x.pw ≤ 20 ? x.pw : x.pw ∈ {21, 24} ? 21 : 22) . fbh (x).pr = (x.pr ≤ 50 ? x.pr : x.pr ≤ 57 ? 51 : 52) .
Using the atomicity predicates Atm0 , . . . , Atm5 , we proved that fbh indeed is a refinement function from HVc2b to HqRW . Because simulation relations are transitive, we thus have a simulation from HVc2 to HqRW . This simulation preserves the values of arg and result and the conditions pw = 0 and pr = 0. It therefore preserves observational equivalence. This concludes the proof of correctness of algorithm C2.
Two safe bits instead of the regular variable
It is possible to replace the three-valued regular variable rr of algorithm C2 by two safe bits, say ra and rb, initially equal. The idea is that ra and rb represent the value of rr when they are equal, and that rr = 2 when ra and rb differ. In the style of Section 3, the reader's lines concerning rr are changed into 54:
(flickering) ra := lw ; 55:
(flickering) rb := lw ; 57:
result := buf[ra, lc] .
The writer's conditional statement based on the test of rr is replaced by 26: if ra = ww then 30:
if rb = ww then 27:
(flickering) fw := true end end .
In the specification corresponding to HVc2 , the writer needs an additional location (30) because its test of rr is replaced by two atomic tests. This alternative specification HVac2 also allows a refinement function towards HVc2a. This function maps a state x of HVac2 to the abstract state In order to prove that this is indeed a refinement function, we need a number of invariants, namely Iq0 , Iq1 , Iq2 as in Section 5.1, and the following four invariants pr / ∈ {54, 55} ⇒ ra = rb , pr = 54 ⇒ rb = lw , pr = 55 ⇒ ra = lw , pw = 30 ⇒ ww = ra ∨ pr = 54 .
In order to prove the last one, we need to introduce several other invariants which are analogues of the invariants Jq* in Section 5.3. The details can be found in the mechanical proof.
Conclusions
It is satisfactory that the algorithm is correct and that we were able to verify this. The structure of the proof with one forward simulation between two refinement functions is also quite satisfactory. The part of the proof in the sections 6.3 up to 6.5 is less satisfactory, in that we had to invent several unintuitive invariants.
Haldar and Vidyasankar verified the algorithm by operational arguments using Lamport's precedence relation between events, cf. [7] . Since we have not seen this proof, we cannot make a comparison. We assume, however, that this operational proof should be at least as delicate as the refinement proof given here. In general, we greatly prefer assertional proofs over operational ones, but the present proof is a weak example. The challenge for assertional methods is of course to provide a more elegant assertional proof, or perhaps even a derivation of the algorithm.
It seems likely that the correctness of algorithm C2 can be confirmed by model checking. This would depend on the fact that there are only one writer and only one reader, so that by some general argument the number of elements of the type Item could be reduced to 2. We must leave this to future research.
